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With  recession  lingering  and  interest  rates  remain- 
ing  high,  one  hears  increasingly  that  the  Fed  should 
abandon  its  money  growth  targets  and  move  to  a 
policy  of  lowering  interest  rates  to  full  employment 
levels.  All  would  be  well,  we  are  told,  if  only  the 
Fed  would  set  a  fixed  low  interest  rate  target  con- 
sistent  with  full  employment  and  then  let  the  money 
stock  adjust  to  money  demand  to  achieve  that  desired 
target  rate.  In  effect,  this  means  that  the  Fed  would 
relinquish  control  over  the  money  stock,  letting  it 
expand  as  required  in  a  vain  effort  to  eliminate  dis- 
crepancies  between  the  market  rate  and  the  predeter- 
mined  target  rate. 
This  low  target  interest  rate  proposal  has  much  in 
common  with  the  long-discredited  real  bills  doctrine, 
according  to  which  the  money  supply  should  expand 
passively  to  accommodate  the  legitimate  needs  of 
trade.  Both  views  contend  that  the  money  supply  is 
(or  should  be)  essentially  demand  determined.  Both 
see  causality  as  running  from  economic  activity  to 
money  rather  than  vice  versa.  And,  in  their  simplest 
versions  at  least,  both  treat  the  price  level  and  its 
rate  of  change  as  predetermined  exogenous  variables 
and  deny  that  inflation  originates  in  the  central  bank. 
In  fact,  both  views  prescribe  positive  monetary  ‘ex- 
pansion  even  in  the  face  of  inflation,  the  one  to  allow 
real  transactions  to  take  place  at  ever-rising  prices, 
the  other  in  an  attempt  to  lower  interest  rates  to 
target  levels.  In  essence,  both  tie  the  money  supply 
directly  to  an  uncontrolled  nominal  variable  that 
reflects  inflationary  pressures-the  volume  of  eligible 
bills  offered  for  discount  in  the  case  of  the  real  bills 
doctrine  and  the  nominal  market  rate-target  rate 
differential  in  the  case  of the  interest-pegging  scheme. 
Finally,  because  they  link  the  money  stock  to  vari- 
ables  that  tend  to  rise  in  step  with  prices,  both  gener- 
ate  inflationary  feedback  mechanisms  in  which  prices 
and  money  chase  each  other  upward  indefinitely.  In 
these  respects,  at  least,  the  interest-pegging  proposal 
may  be  viewed  as  a  recent  variant  of  the  old  real  bills 
doctrine.1 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  trace  the  origin 
and  historical  evolution  of  the  real  bills  doctrine  and 
to  show  how  that  doctrine  survives  today  in  the 
interest-targeting  scheme.  Before  doing  so,  however, 
it  is  necessary  to  spell  out  the  essential  features  of 
the  doctrine  and  to  identify  its  underlying  error. 
What  is the  Real  Bills  Doctrine? 
Essentially,  the  real  bills  doctrine  is  a  rule  pur- 
porting  to  gear  money  to  production  via  the  short- 
term  commercial  bill  of  exchange,  thereby  ensuring 
that  output  generates  its  own  means  of  purchase  and 
money  adapts  passively  to  the  legitimate  needs  of 
trade.  The  doctrine  states  that  money  can  never  be 
excessive  when  issued  against  short-term  commercial 
bills  arising  from  real  transactions  in  goods  and 
1 Thomas  Sargent  for  one  recognizes  the  essential  simi- 
larity  between  the  interest-pegging  view  and  the  real  bills 
doctrine.  Says  he: 
. . . it  has  often  been  argued  that  the  proper  function 
of  the  monetary  authorities  is  to  set  the  interest  rate 
at  some  reasonable  level,  allowing  the  money  supply 
to  be  whatever  it  must  be  to  ensure  that  the  demand 
for  money  at  that  interest  rate  is  satisfied.  Such  a 
rule  was  actually  written  into  the  original  act  that 
established  the  Federal  Reserve  System  in  the  U.S. 
The  rule  was  known  as  the  “real  bills”  doctrine.  It 
was  alleged  that  the  quantity  of  money  would  auto- 
matically  be  properly  regulated  if  the  monetary  au- 
thorities  ensured  that  banks  always  had  enough 
reserves  to  meet  the  demand  for  loans  intended  to 
finance  “real”  (as  opposed  to  “speculative”)  invest- 
ments  at  an  interest-rate  set  “with  a  view  of  accom- 
modating  commerce  and  business.” 
Thomas  J.  Sargent,  Macroeconomic  Theory  (New  York: 
Academic  Press,  1979),  p.  92.  See  also  Lance  Girton, 
who  states  that  cheap-money,  low-interest  rate.  policies 
are  “a  close  substitute  for  a  real-bills  money  supply 
mechanism,  and  subject  to  the  same  defect.”  Lance 
Girton,  “SDR  Creation  And  The  Real-Bills  Doctrine,” 
Southern  Economic  Journal,  41  (July  1974),  58,  footnote 
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so  long  as  banks  lend  only  against  sound,  short-term 
commercial  paper  the  money  stock  will  be  secured 
by  and  will  automatically  vary  equiproportionally 
with  real  output  such  that  the  latter  will  be  matched 
by  just  enough  money  to  purchase  it  at  existing 
prices.2  In  other  words,  inflationary  overissue  is 
impossible  provided  money  is  issued  on  loans  made 
to  finance  real  transactions. 
2 This  conclusion-that  a  real-bills-based  money  stock 
will  be  just  sufficient  to  purchase  the  economy’s  real 
output  at.  existing  prices-is  derived  as  follows:  First, 
define  the  needs  of  trade  T  as  the  value  of  inventories  of 
working  capital  or  goods-in-process  G,  the  production  of 
which  must  be  financed  by  bank  loans.  Symbolically 
(1)  T  =  G. 
Second,  assume  that  each  dollar’s  worth  of  goods-in- 
process  G  generates  an  equivalent  quantity  of  paper 
claims  in  the  form  of  commercial  bills  B  which  business 
borrowers  offer  as  collateral  behind  their  loan  demands 
Ld.  That  is,  assume  that 
(2)  G  =  B  and 
(3)  B  =  Ld. 
Third,  observe  that  these  loan  demands  Ld  pass  the  real 
bills  test  (i.e.,  they  are  secured  by  claims  to  real  goods) 
and  therefore  are  accommodated  by  a  matching  supply  of 
bank  loans  LS  as  indicated  by  the  expression 
(4) Ld =  Ls. 
Fourth,  note  that  since  banks  supply  loans  in  the  form 
of  banknotes  and/or  demand  deposits  the  sum  of  which 
comprises  the  money  stock,  the  supply  of  loans  Ls  must 
equal  the  stock  of  money  MS, 
(5)  Ls  =  Ms. 
Substituting  equations  1-4  into  5  and  solving  for  the 
money  stock  yields 
(6)  Ms  =  T 
which  says  that  as  long  as  banks  lend  only  against  short- 
term  commercial  bills  arising  out  of  transactions  in  real 
goods  and  services,  the  money  stock  will  conform  to  the 
needs  of  trade.  Since  the  needs  of  trade  T  and  the  value 
of  goods-in-process  G  are  identically  equal  one  can  also 
write 
(7)  Ms  =  G 
which  states  that  the  money  supply  is  ultimately  secured 
by  goods-in-process  such  that  when  those  goods  reach 
the  market  they  will  be  matched  by  just  enough  money 
to  purchase  them  at  existing  prices.  This  can  be  shown 
by  -defining  the  value  of  go&-in-process  G  as  the  multi- 
plicative  product  of  the  price  P  and  quantity  Q  of  those 
goods,  i.e., 
(8)  G  =  PQ. 
Substituting  equation  8  into  7  yields 
(9)  Ms  =  PQ 
which  says  that  assuming  prices  P  given,  the  money 
stock  Ms-varies  in  step  with real  production  Q.  This  is 
the  essence  of  the  real  bills  doctrine.  Its  error  lies  in 
treating  prices  as  exogenous  when  in  fact  they  are  deter- 
mined  by  the  money  stock  itself. 
Underwriting  Inflation 
The  doctrine  overlooks  that  the  demand  for  loans 
depends  not  only  upon  the  quantity  of  real  trans- 
actions  but  also  upon  the  level  of  prices  at  which 
those  real  transactions  are  effected.  And  rising  prices 
would  require  an  ever-growing  volume  of  loans  just 
to  finance  the  same  level  of  real  transactions.  Under 
the  real  bills  criterion  these  loans  would  be  granted 
and  the  stock  of  money  would  therefore  expand. 
This  monetary  expansion  would  raise  prices  thereby 
requiring  further  monetary  expansion  leading  to  still 
higher  prices  and  so  on  in  a never-ending  inflationary 
sequence.  In  this  way,  price  inflation  would  induce 
the  very  monetary  expansion  necessary  to  perpetuate 
it  and  the  real  bills  criterion  would  provide  no  effec- 
tive  limit  to  the  quantity  of  money  in  existence.  Here 
is  the  error  of  the  real  bills  doctrine,  namely  the 
tendency  to  treat  prices  as  given  when  in  fact  they 
vary  directly  with  the  money  stock.  Associated  with 
this  is  the  failure  to  perceive  the  two-way  inflationary 
interaction  between  money  and  prices  that  results 
once  money  is  allowed  to  be  governed  by  the  needs 
of  trade. 
Dynamic  Instability 
The  preceding  has  identified  the  flaw  in  the  doc- 
trine  as  its  failure  to  take  account  of  the  price-money- 
price  feedback  loop  that  renders  the  real  bills  mech- 
anism  dynamically  unstable.3  As  early  as  1802 
3  This  dynamic  instability  can  be  illustrated  by  introduc- 
ing  a  one-period  time  lag  into  the  real  bills  money  supply 
function  (equation  9  of  the  preceding  footnote)  and 
adding  the  quantity  theory  equation  of  exchange  to 
determine  the  current  price  level.  Specifically,  let  the 
current  period’s  money  supply  M  be  tied  to  last  period’s 
nominal  national  product  QP-1  via  the  real  bills  money 
supply  relationship 
(1)  M  =  aQP-1 
where  a  is  the  fixed  ratio  of  money  to  lagged nominal 
national  product  and  real  output  Q  is  assumed  to  be  fixed 
at  its  constant  full  capacity  level.  Given  real  output  this 
equation  says  that  last  period’s  price  level  P-1  determines 
this  period’s  money  stock.  Next,  assume  that  money 
determines  prices  contemporaneously  via  the  equation  of 
exchange 
(2)  P  =  (V/Q)M 
where  V  is  the  constant  circulation  velocity  or  rate  of 
turnover  of  money. 
Lagging  equation  2  one  period,  substituting  it  into 
equation  1,  and  solving  the  resulting  first  order  difference 
equation  for  the  time  path  of  the  money  stock  yields 
(3)  M  =  Mo(aV)t 
where  t  is  time  and  M0  is  the  arbitrary  initial  money 
stock.  Similarly,  the  time  path  of  the  price  level  is  given 
by  the  expression 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1982 Henry  Thornton  had  already  recognized  this  inherent 
instability.  Real  bills  proponents,  said  he,  “forgot 
that  there  might  be  no  bounds  to  the  demand  for 
paper;  that  the  increasing  quantity  would  contribute 
to  the  rise  [in  the  prices]  of  commodities  :  and  the 
rise  of  commodities  require,  and  seem  to  justify,  a 
still  further  increase.“4  More  recently,  Don  Patinkin, 
referring  to  “the  vicious  cycle  of  inflation  (or  de- 
flation)  generated  by  a  policy  based  on  the  real  bills 
doctrine,”  identified  the  source  of  this  instability: 
For  the  essence  of  this  doctrine  [Patinkin  says]  is 
that  the  banking  system  should  expand  credit  in 
accordance  with  the  “legitimate  needs  of  business” 
-where  these  “needs”  are  measured  in  money 
terms,  and  thus  increase  proportionately  with  the 
price  level.  [The  result  is]  that  any  (say)  upward 
price  movement  .  .  .  will-in  accordance  with  the 
“real  bills  doctrine”-generate  an  increased  supply 
of  money  which  will  enable  the  movement  to  con- 
tinue  indefinitely.6 
In  other  words,  the  doctrine  ignores  the  fact  that 
the  needs  of  trade  are  measured  in  nominal  terms 
that  rise  in  step  with  prices.  Since  monetary  expan- 
sion  raises  prices  and  rising  prices,  by  expanding  the 
needs  of  trade,  are  allowed  to  generate  further  in- 
creases  in  the  money  stock,  the  result  is  a  vicious 
circle  of  inflation  in  which  money  and  prices  chase 
each  other  upward  indefinitely.  In  short,  because  it 
ties  the  money  supply  to  a  nominal  magnitude  that 
moves  in  step  with  prices,  the  real  bills  doctrine 
provides  no  effective  constraint  on  money  or  prices, 
both  of  which  can  rise  without  limit  (see  Box,  pp. 
6-7).  Here  is  the  fallacy  of  using  one  uncontrolled 
(4)  P  =  Po(aV)t 
where  Po  is  the  arbitrary  initial  price  level.  Far  from 
limiting  prices  and  the  money  supply,  equations  3  and  4 
state  that  money  and  prices  will  either  rise  without  limit 
or  fall  to  zero  with  the  passage  of  time  depending  upon 
whether  the  term  enclosed  by  parentheses  is  greater  than 
or  less  than  unity.  Only  in  the  singular  case  in  which 
the  coefficient  a  is  precisely  equal  to  the  reciprocal 
(inverse)  of  velocity  will  the  money  supply  and  the  price 
level  stabilize.  But  this  case  is  unlikely  to  happen  since 
a  and  V  are  determined  by  different  factors.  Specifically, 
a  is  determined  by  businessmen’s  desired  inventory/ 
output  ratios,  by  the  proportion  of  working  capital  finan- 
ced  by  bank  loans,  and  by  the  proportion  of  total  bank 
loans  made  for  working  capital  versus  nonworking  capital 
purposes.  By  contrast,  velocity  is  determined  by  cash 
holders  decisions  regarding  the  fraction  of  income  they 
wish  to  hold  in  the  form  of  money  balances.  Because  of 
this  it  is  unlikely  that  the  product  aV  will  assume  its 
money-stabilizing  value  of  unity. 
4 Henry  Thornton,  Two  Speeches  of  Henry  Thornton, 
Esq.  on  the Bullion  Report,  May  1811.  Reprinted  in  An 
Enquiry  into  the  Nature and  Effects  of  the Paper  Credit 
of  Great  Britain  (1802),  ed.  by  F.  A.  v.  Hayek  (New 
York:  Rinehart  &  Company,  Inc.,  1939),  p.  342. 
5  Don  Patinkin,  Money,  Interest, and  Prices,  2nd  ed. 
(New  York:  Harper  and  Row,  1965),  p.  309. 
nominal  variable  (the  money  value  of  real  transac- 
tions)  to  regulate  another  nominal  variable  (the 
money  stock).  This  is  the  fundamental  fallacy  of  the 
real  bills  doctrine. 
Historical  Origins:  John  Law 
Having  spelled  out  the  real  bills  doctrine  and 
identified  its  underlying  error,  the  next  step  is  to 
trace  the  evolution  of  the  doctrine  in  the  history  of 
monetary  thought.  The  concept  of  an  output- 
governed  currency  secured  by  claims  to  real  property 
and  responding  to  the  needs  of  trade  has  a  long  his- 
tory  dating  back  almost  280  years.  The  basic  idea 
originated  with  John  Law  (1671-1729)  who  in  his 
Money  and  Trade  Considered  (1705)  proposed  that 
the  banknote  issue  be  secured  by  and  bear  a  fixed 
ratio  to  the  market  value  of  land.  In  arguing  for  a 
land-collateralized  note  issue,  Law  contended  ( 1) 
that  money’s  purchasing  power  ought  to  be  stable, 
(2)  that  such  purchasing  power  stability  requires 
limiting  the  note  issue  to  the  real  needs  of  trade,  (3) 
that  this  limitation  can  be  achieved  by  tying  notes  to 
the  value  of  land  (a  proxy  for  the  level  of  economic 
activity),  and  (4)  that  doing  so  provides  an  auto- 
matic  check  to  overissue  since  notes  cannot  exceed 
the  value  of  their  collateral.6  Here  is  the  origin  of 
the  idea  that  money  cannot  be  inflationary  if  backed 
by  sound  productive  assets. 
Law’s  Error 
To  summarize,  Law  sought  a  criterion  that  would 
limit  money  expansion  and  ensure  price  stability.  He 
thought  that  land’s  value  provided  such  a  criterion. 
Collateralized  by  land,  money  could  never  be  over- 
issued  since  it  would  always  be  constrained  by  the 
value  of  the  real  property  backing  it.  What  he  over- 
looked  was  that  the  market  value  of  property  con- 
tains  a price  component  and  that  this  price  component 
is  determined  by  the  money  supply  itself.  Since 
money  determines  the  level  of  prices  and  the  latter, 
through  its  influence  on  the  value  of  land,  is  allowed 
to  determine  the  size  of  the  money  stock,  the  result 
is  a  two-way  inflationary  interaction  between  money 
and  prices  in  which  both  can  rise  without  limit.  That 
is,  he  failed  to  see  that  monetary  expansion  raises 
prices  and  that  rising  prices,  by  augmenting  the 
nominal  value  of  land,  justifies  further  monetary 
6 On  Law  see  Lloyd  W.  Mints,  A  History  of  Banking 
Theory  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1945), 
pp.  15-16,  18,  20,  30-32  and  Frank  W.  Fetter,  Develop- 
ment  of  British  Monetary  Orthodoxy  1797-1875  (Cam- 
bridge:  Harvard  University  Press,  1965),  pp.  7-9. 
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on  in  a  cumulative  inflationary  sequence.  In  short, 
he  erred  in  ignoring  that  Box 
whereas  convertibility  into  a  given physical  amount 
of  specie  (or  any  other  economic  good)  will  limit 
the  quantity  of  notes  that  can  be  issued  .  .  .  the 
basing  of  notes  on  a  given  money’s  worth  of  any 
form  of  wealth-be  it  land  or  merchants’  stocks- 
presents  the  possibility  of  an  unlimited  expansion 
of  loans  .  .  .7 
Money  and  Price  Level  Instability 
in  a  Real  Bills  Regime 
Because  of  this,  he  failed  to  see  that  the  money  value 
of  land  provides  no  effective  limit  to  the  money  stock 
or  prices,  both  of  which  can  expand  indefinitely.8 
Here  is  the  origin  of  the  basic  fallacy  of  the  real  bills 
doctrine,  namely  the  notion  that  one  nominal  variable 
(the  money  value  of  land)  can  be  used  to  control  the 
nominal  money  stock. 
Adam  Smith 
If  Law  was  the  first  to  state  that  banknotes  vary 
optimally  when  collateralized  by  the  value  of  real 
property,  then  Adam  Smith  (1723-1790)  was  the 
first  to  contend  that  they  do  so  when  secured  by 
The  following  charts  illustrate  the  inherent  dynamic 
instability  of  the  real  bills  money  supply  mechanism  dis- 
cussed  in  the  text.  Assuming  real  output  constant,  the 
charts  plot  money  supply  and  money  demand  (equations 
1 and  2  of  footnote  3)  as  increasing  linear  functions  of  the 
price  level.  Money  supply  rises  with  prices  because  rising 
prices  raise  the  nominal  value  of  economic  activity  and 
thereby  justify,  via  the  real  bills  criterion,  further  in- 
creases  in  the  money  stock.  Likewise,  money  demand 
also  rises  with  prices  because  people  need  to  hold  more 
cash  to  purchase  the  constant  quantity  of  real  output  at 
higher  prices.  The  slopes  of  the  two  curves  show  the 
sensitivity  or  responsiveness  of  money  supply  and  de- 
mand  to  price  level  changes.  Since  these  sensitivities  are 
determined  by  different  sets  of  factors,  it  is  unlikely  that 
both  curves  will  possess  identical  slopes.  In  particular, 
the  price  responsiveness  of  money  supply  is  determined 
by  such  conditions  as  (1)  businessmen’s  desired  inven- 
tory/output  ratios,  (2)  by  the  fraction  of  working  capital 
financed  by  bank  loans,  and  (3)  by  the  proportion  of  total 
bank  loans  made  for  working  capital  purposes.  By  con- 
7 Mints,  History,  p.  30. 
8 Law’s  error  is  easily  demonstrated.  Following  him,  let 
the  note  issue  N  be  rigidly  tied  to  the  value  of  land  V  by 
the  formula  (rule) 
(1)  N  =  kV 
where  k  is  the  fixed  ratio  of  notes  to  the  value  of  land. 
By  definition,  the  total  value  of  land  is  the  multiplicative 
product  of  the  fixed  quantity  of  land  L  times  the  price 
per  acre  P,,  i.e., 
(2)  v  =  LPL 
Now  the  price  of  land  PL  is  linked  to  the  general  price 
level  P  via  the  relative  price  relationship 
(3)  PL  =  aP 
where  a  is  the  relative  price  of  land  in  terms  of  the 
general  price  level,  as  can  be  seen  by  rewriting  the  equa- 
tion  as  a  =  PL/P.  Finally,  assume  that  the  price  level  P 
is  a  lagged  function  of  the  note  issue  N-1,  i.e.,  money 
determines  prices  with  a  one-period  lag.  Symbolically, 
(4)  P  =  bN-1 
where  b  is  the  constant  coefficient  linking  money  to 
prices.  Substituting  equations  2-4  into  1  and  solving  the 
resulting  difference  equation  for  the  time  path  of  the  note 
issue  yields 
(5)  N  =  No[kLab]t 
where  t  is  time  and  No  is  the  initial  quantity  of  notes. 
Far  from  limiting  the  note  issue,  equation  5  says  that  the 
stock  of  notes  will  either  rise  without  limit  or  fall  to  zero 
with  the  passage  of  time  depending  upon  whether  the 
bracketed  term  is  greater  than  or  less  than  unity.  Note 
that  since  each  component  of  the  bracketed  term  is  deter- 
mined  by  different  factors  it  is  unlikely  that  the  product 
of  these  components  will  assume  its  money-stabilizing 
value  of  unity. 
6  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER  1982 trast,  the  slope  or  price  responsiveness  of  the  money 
demand  function  is  determined  by  the  fraction  of  nominal 
income  that  people  desire  to  hold  in  the  form  of  cash 
balances-this  fraction  being  the  inverse  of  the  circulation 
velocity  of  money.  Only  by  accident  would  the  slopes  of 
the  two  curves  be  the  same. 
Chart  1  depicts  the  inflationary  case  in  which  money 
supply  is  more  responsive  to  price  level  changes  than  is 
money  demand,  as  indicated  by  the  steeper  slope  of  the 
money  supply  function.  This  case  is  characterized  by  a 
persistent  (and  growing)  excess  supply  of  money  that 
continually  bids  up  prices.  Starting  with  an  arbitrary 
initial  money  stock  M0  the  chart  traces  out  a  monotonic 
explosive  sequence  of  ever-rising  money  and  prices  show- 
ing  that  the  real  bills  mechanism  is  incapable  of  limiting 
either  variable. 
Chart  2  depicts  the  opposite  case  in  which  the  real  bills 
money  supply  function  is  less  sensitive  to  price  level 
changes  than  is  money  demand.  This  case  is  character- 
ized  by  a persistent  excess  demand  for  money  that  causes 
money  and  prices  to  fall  to  zero.  Here  is  the  potential 
for  severe  deflation  inherent  in  the  real  bills  mechanism. 
Finally,  Chart  3  depicts  the  special  case  in  which 
money  supply  coincides  with  money  demand  at  all  price 
levels.  In  this  particular  case  the  real  bills  mechanism  is 
said  to  be  indeterminate,  i.e.,  incapable  of  yielding  a 
unique  equilibrium  solution  for  money  and  prices.  It 
cannot  yield  a  determinate  solution  because  all  points  on 
the  money  supply/money  demand  curve  represent  equilib- 
rium  points.  In  this  case,  the  mechanism  determines  only 
the  ratio  of  money  to  prices  but  not  those  variables 
separately.  To  be  sure,  one  can  fix  either  money  or 
prices  from  outside  the  mechanism,  i.e.,  one  can  arbi- 
trarily  set  money  at  M0  or  prices  at  PO.  Doing  so  results 
in  stability  for  both.  But  the  mechanism  itself  is  incap- 
able  of  determining  this  solution.  In  short,  Charts  l-3 
indicate  that  the  money  stock  and  price  level  in  a  real 
bills  regime  are  either  dynamically  unstable  or  indeter- 
minate.  Either  way,  the  real  bills  criterion  is  incapable 
of  limiting  the  money  stock  and  for  that  reason  alone 
constitutes  a  disastrous  guide  to  policy. 
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doing,  he  shifted  the  emphasis  from  land  to  commer- 
cial  paper  as  the  basis  of  the  currency.  Paper  money, 
he  wrote,  varies  optimally  with  the  needs  of  trade 
when  each  bank  “discounts  to  a  merchant  a  real  bill 
of  exchange  drawn  by  a  real  creditor  upon  a  real 
debtor,  and  which,  as  soon  as  it  becomes  due,  is  really 
paid  by  that  debtor.“9  Here  is  the  origin  of  the 
phrase  “real  bill”  to  denote  short-term  commercial 
paper  arising  from  real  transactions  in  goods  and 
services.  Smith’s  statement  of  it  marks  him  as  “the 
first  thoroughgoing  exponent  of  the  real  bills  doc- 
trine”  in  its  modern  form.10 
While  endorsing  the  doctrine,  however,  Smith 
managed  to  avoid  some  of  its  shortcomings.  He 
realized,  for  example,  that  the  real  bills  criterion  by 
itself  is  not  sufficient  to  prevent  overissue.  For  that 
reason  he  advocated  specie  (i.e.,  gold)  convertibility 
as  the  ultimate  constraint  on  the  quantity  of  paper 
money.  That  is,  he  held  that  banks  should  be  re- 
quired  by  law  to  convert  their  paper  notes  into  specie 
at  a  fixed  price  upon  demand.  Constrained  by  the 
convertibility  obligation,  banks,  he  felt,  would  rarely 
overissue.  In  short,  he  viewed  specie  convertibility 
as  the  overriding  check  to  overissue.  In  so  doing,  he 
avoided  the  error  of  supposing  that  the  real  bills 
criterion  per  se  provides  a  sufficient  limitation  to  the 
note  issue  regardless  of  the  monetary  regime. 
He  also  avoided  the  dynamic  instability  or  vicious 
circle  problem  that  results  from  the  two-way  inter- 
action  between  money  and  prices  in  the  real  bills 
mechanism.  His  version  of  the  doctrine  excludes  the 
possibility  of  such  inflationary  interaction  by  explic- 
itly  breaking  the  transmission  linkage  running  from 
money  to  prices.  He  severed  that  link  by  treating 
the  price  level  as  a  predetermined  exogenous  variable 
that  is  invariant  with  respect  to  the  note  issue.  More 
precisely,  Smith  argued  that  under  specie  converti- 
bility  the  commodity  price  level  is  determined  in 
world  markets  by  the  relative  cost  of  producing  gold 
and  goods  and  then  given  exogenously  to  the  open 
national  economy.  And  with  prices  thus  predeter- 
mined,  it  follows  that  they  must  be  invariant  with 
respect  to  the  domestic  note  issue,  i.e.,  paper  money 
cannot  affect  prices  in  the  small  open  economy.  This 
breaks  the  vicious  circle  of  inflation  and  money 
growth  inherent  in  conventional  versions  of  the  real 
9 Adam  Smith,  An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of 
the  Wealth  of  Nations  (1776),  (New  York:  Random 
House,  1937),  p.  288. 
10 Mints,  History,  p.  25. 
bills  doctrine  and  renders  Smith’s  version  immune 
to  the  problem  of  dynamic  instability.11 
The  Antibullionists  (Early  1800s) 
As  previously  mentioned,  Adam  Smith  was  astute 
enough  to  present  the  real  bills  doctrine  within  the 
context  of  a  convertible  currency  regime  in  which 
specie  convertibility  limits  the  note  issue  and  price- 
level  exogeneity  prevents  it  from  generating  inflation. 
Later,  less  astute  writers  incautiously  extended  the 
doctrine  to  the  case  of  currency  inconvertibility  in 
which  those  safeguards  are  absent.  Chief  among 
these  writers  were  the antibullionists  who  employed 
the  doctrine  to  defend  the  Bank  of  England  against 
the  charge  that  it  had  taken  advantage  of  the  suspen- 
sion  of  specie  convertibility  during  the  Napoleonic 
wars  to  overissue  the  currency. 
The  antibullionists  adhered  to  the  doctrine  in  its 
crudest,  most  uncompromising  form.  They  argued 
that  it  provided  a  sufficient  safeguard  to  overissue 
even  under  inconvertibility.  That  is,  they  argued 
that  even  an  inconvertible  paper  currency  could  not 
be  issued  to  excess  as  long  as  it  was  advanced  only 
upon  the’  discount  of  sound,  short-term  commercial 
bills.  Two  considerations,  they  said,  ensured  that  a 
currency  backed  by  real  bills  could  never  be  over- 
supplied.  First, being geared to real transactions, 
the  quantity  of  currency  could  never  exceed  the  real 
demand  for  it.  More  precisely, 
bank  paper  issued  against  the  genuine  ‘needs  of 
trade’-that  is  against  real  security-could  never 
become  ‘excessive.’  Such  issues  could  never  be  the 
active  factor  in  any  price  rise  because  if  they  were 
the  equivalent  of  real  security  they  would  only  be 
meeting  a  demand  for  credit  which  was already in 
existence  :  hence-according  to  this  view-bank 
credit  met  the  needs  of  trade  and  did  nothing  to 
create  those  needs.12 
In  other  words  the  supply  of  real  product  generates 
just enough  money  to  purchase  it  at  existing  prices. 
Second,  since  no  one  would  borrow  at  interest  money 
not  needed,  banks  could  not  force  an  excess  issue  on 
the  market.  Associated  with  this  was  the  argument 
that if  indeed  the  currency  was  temporarily  excessive, 
the  excess  would  immediately  return  to  the  banks  to 
pay  off  costly  loans.  In  short,  interest-minimization 
considerations  would  ensure  that  any  excess  notes 
would  quickly  be  retired  from  circulation. 
11 On  this  point  see  David  Laidler,  “Adam  Smith  as  a 
Monetary  Economist,”  Canadian  Journal  of  Economics 
14,  no.  2,  (May  1981)  196-97. 
12 B.  A.  Corry,  Money,  Saving  and  Investment  in  English 
Economics  1800-1850  (New  York:  St.  Martin’s  Press, 
1962),  p.  75. 
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the  Bank  of  England  against  the  charge  that  it  had 
caused  inflation.  The  Bank,  they  said,  was  blameless 
since  it  had  restricted  its  issues  to  real  bills  of  ex- 
change  and  therefore  had  merely  responded  to  the 
real  needs  of  trade.  That  is,  the  Bank  could  not 
possibly  be  the  source  of inflation  because,  by  limiting 
its  advances  to  commercial  paper  representing  actual 
output,  it  had  merely  responded  to  a  demand  for 
money  already  in  existence  and  had  done  nothing  to 
create  that  demand.  Here  is  the  origin  of  the  notion 
that  central  banks  cannot  cause  inflation  since  they 
merely  supply  money  passively  in  response  to  a  prior 
real  demand  for  it.  Besides  this  there  was  the  argu- 
ment  that  since  no  one  would  borrow  at  interest 
money  not  needed,  the  Bank  could  not  force  an  excess 
issue  on  the  market.  Overlooked  was  the  fact  that  the 
demand  for  loans  depends  not  upon  the  loan  interest 
rate  itself  but  rather  upon  that  rate  relative  to  the 
expected  rate  of  return  on  the  use  of  the  borrowed 
funds.  If  the  latter  rate  exceeds  the  former,  the 
demand  for  loans  becomes  insatiable  and  the  real  bills 
criterion  presents  no  bar  to  overissue.  This  was  a 
key  point  in  Henry  Thornton’s  criticism  of  the  real 
bills  doctrine. 
Henry  Thornton’s  Criticisms 
If  the  antibullionists  were  the  strongest  proponents 
of the  real  bills  doctrine  then  Henry  Thornton  (1760- 
1815),  the  British  banker,  monetary  theorist,  and 
long-time  member  of  Parliament,  was  by  far  its 
ablest  and  most  penetrating  critic.  His  devastating 
critique  of  the  doctrine  remains  unsurpassed  to  this 
very  day.  In  his  parliamentary  speeches  and  his 
classic  An  Enquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Effects  of  the 
Paper  Credit  of  Great  Britain  (1802)  he  flatly  denied 
that  the  real  bills  criterion  can  effectively  limit  the 
note  issue.  Indeed,  he  went  out  of  his  way  to  de- 
nounce  “the  error  .  .  .  of  imagining  that  a  proper 
limitation  of  bank  notes  may  be  sufficiently  secured 
by  attending  merely  to  the  nature  of  the  security  for 
which  they  are  given.“13  He  then  proceeded  to  attack 
the  doctrine  on  at  least  three  grounds. 
First,  he  contended  that  the  volume  of  eligible  bills 
coming  forward  for  discount  depends  not  only  upon 
the  quantity  of goods  produced,  but  also  upon  the  rate 
of  turnover  of  those  goods  and  the  period  of  credit 
or  length  of  time  that  bills  have  to  run.  Goods,  he 
pointed  out,  may  be  sold  a number  of times,  each  sale 
giving  rise  to  a  real  bill.  Also,  the  period  for  which  a 
13 Thornton,  Paper  Credit,  p.  244. 
given  bill  is  customarily  drawn  may  exceed  the  turn- 
over  period  of  goods.  Thus,  depending  upon  the 
number  of  transactions  between  merchants  in  bring- 
ing  goods  to  market  and  the  period  of  credit,  any 
number  of  bills  can  be  generated  upon  the  alleged 
security  of  the  same  goods.  For  example, 
Suppose  that  A  sells  one  [dollar’s]  worth  of  goods 
to  B  at  six  months  credit,  and  takes  a  bill  at  six 
months  for  it;  and  that  B,  within  a  month  after, 
sells  the  same  goods,  at  a like  credit,  to  C, taking  a 
like  bill;  and  again,  that  C,  after  another  month, 
sells  them  to  D,  taking  a  like  bill,  and  so  on.14 
At  the  end  of  six  months,  $6  of  bills,  all  eligible  for 
discount,  would  be  outstanding  even  though  only  $1 
worth  of goods  had  been  produced.  And  if the  length 
of  credit  (maturity  of  each  bill)  were  12  rather  than 
6  months,  then  $12  of  bills  could  be  issued  on  the 
security  of the  original  $1  worth  of goods.  In  general, 
the  volume  of  bills  outstanding  will  be 
(1)  B=mGt 
where  B  is  the  volume  of  bills,  m  their  maturity,  G 
the  nominal  stock  of  goods,  and  t  its  annual  turn- 
over  rate.  Extension  either  of  the  maturity  of  bills 
or  of  the  turnover  rate  of  goods  would,  Thornton 
claimed,  result  in  “the  greatest  imaginable  multipli- 
cation”  of  bills  on  the  basis  of  a  given  quantum  of 
goods.15  Because  of  this,  the  quantity  of  money 
issued  against  real  bills  would  far  exceed  the  needs 
of  trade. 
Second,  Thornton  argued  that  the  doctrine  fails  to 
perceive  that  monetary  expansion  raises  prices  and 
that  rising  prices,  by  expanding  the  needs  of  trade, 
generate  further  inflationary  increases  in  the  quantity 
of  money.  The  result  is  a  vicious  circle  of  inflation 
in  which  money  and  prices  chase  each  other  upward 
indefinitely.  Because  it  links  the  money  supply  to  a 
nominal  magnitude  that  moves  in  step  with  prices, 
the  real  bills  doctrine  provides  no  constraint  on  prices 
or  the  quantity  of  money,  both  of  which  can  rise 
without  limit.  The  fallacy  of  the  real  bills  doctrine, 
said  Thornton,  is  that  it  “considered  security  as  every 
thing  and  quantity  as  nothing.”  Its  proponents 
forgot  that  there  might  be no  bounds  to the  demand 
for  paper;  that  the  increasing  quantity  would 
contribute  to  the  rise  of  commodities:  and  the  rise 
of  commodities  require,  and  seem  to  justify,  a  still 
further  increase.16 
14 Thornton,  Paper  Credit,  p. 86. 
15 Thornton,  Paper  Credit,  p. 253. 
16 Thornton,  Paper  Credit,  p. 342. 
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instability  of  the  real  bills  mechanism. 
Finally,  Thornton  argued  that  the  supply  of  eligible 
bills  becomes  inexhaustible  and  the  corresponding 
demand  for  loans  insatiable  when  the  loan  rate  of 
interest  is  pegged  below  the  expected  rate  of  profit 
on  new  capital  investment.  He  explained  in  great 
detail  how  such  a  rate  differential,  by  making  bor- 
rowing  profitable,  would  set  in  motion  a  process  of 
cumulative  expansion  of  bills,  loans,  money,  and 
prices.  This  expansion,  he  said,  would  persist  as 
long  as  the  loan  rate  remained  below  the  expected 
profit  rate.  Given  the  interest  rate  differential,  money 
and  prices  would  rise  without  limit  and  the  real  bills 
criterion  would  fail  to  provide  the  needed  constraint. 
He  reached  this  conclusion  via  the  following  route. 
He  argued,  first,  that  the  demand  for  new  loans 
depends  primarily  upon  the  profit  rate-loan  rate 
differential.17  Secondly,  assuming  that  new  loan 
demands  are  accommodated  via  corresponding  in- 
creases  in  the  note  issue,  and  that  the  increased  note 
issue  is  spent  on  the  fixed  full  capacity  level  of  real 
output  thereby  raising  prices  equiproportionally  with 
the  money  stock,  it  follows  that  money  and  prices 
also  rise  in  proportion  to  the  interest  rate  differential, 
growing  without  limit  as  that  differential  persists.18 
17 “In  order  to  ascertain  how  far  the  desire  of  obtaining 
loans  at  the  bank  may  be  expected  at  any  time  to  be 
carried  [he  writes],  we  must  enquire  into  the  subject  of 
the  quantum  of  profit  likely  to  be  derived  from  borrowing 
there  under  the  existing  circumstances.  This  is  to  be 
judged  of  by  considering  two  points:  the  amount,  first  of 
interest  to  be  paid  on  the  sum  borrowed;  and,  secondly, 
of  the  mercantile  or  other  gain  to  be  obtained  by  the  em- 
ployment  of  the  borrowed  capital  .  .  .  .  We  may,  there- 
fore,  consider  this  question  as  turning  principally  on  a 
comparison  of  the  rate  of  interest  taken  at  the  bank  with 
the  current  rate  of  mercantile  profit.”  Thornton,  Paper 
Credit,  pp.  253-54. 
18 To  demonstrate  how  Thornton  reached  this  conclusion, 
consider  the  simplest  possible  version  of  his  model.  First, 
suppose  that  business  loan  demands  Ld  expand  in  propro- 
tion  to  the  profit  rate-loan  rate  differential  (R-R)  ac- 
cording  to  the  expression 
where  the  dot  over  the  loan  demand  variable  denotes  the 
rate  of  change  (time  derivative)  of  that  variable  and  a  is 
the  coefficient  linking  new  loan  demands  to  the  profit 
rate-interest  rate  differential.  Second,  assume  that  the 
new  loan  demands  are  backed  by  a  corresponding  expan- 
sion  in  the  volume  of  eligible  bills  B  offered  for  discount. 
Because  these  bills  pass  the  real  bills  test.  the  new  loan 
demands  are  accommodated  via  an  equivalent 
in  the  money  stock  MS.  In  symbols, 
expansion 
where  Ld  denotes  loan  demand,  B  the  volume  of  bills, 
MS  the  money  stock,  and  the  dots  denote  the  rates  of 
change  (time  derivative)  of  the  attached  variables.  Third, 
suppose  that  prices  P  rise  in  proportion  to  rises  in  the 
money  stock  according  to  the  equation 
In  this  connection,  Thornton  stressed  that  the  interest 
differential,  if  maintained  indefinitely,  produces  a 
continuous  and  not  merely  a  one-time  rise  in  money 
and  prices.  This  is  so,  he  said,  because  as  long  as  the 
differential  persists,  borrowing  will  continue  to  be 
profitable  even  at  successively  higher  price  levels. 
The  result  will  be  more  borrowing,  more  lending, 
more  monetary  expansion,  still  higher  prices  and  so 
on  ad  infinitum  in  a  cumulative  inflationary  spiral. 
Here,  almost  100  years  before  Knut  Wicksell  himself 
expressed  it,  is  the  essence  of  the  Wicksellian  cumu- 
lative  process. 
On  the  basis  of  the  foregoing  analysis,  Thornton 
drew  several  conclusions  regarding  the  validity  of  the 
real  bills  doctrine.  First,  the  real  bills  constraint  is 
ineffective  in  the  face  of  a  positive  profit  rate-loan 
rate  differential.  For  as  long  as  the  differential  per- 
sists  and  credit  rationing  is  not  applied,  money, 
prices,  and  the  volume  of  eligible  bills  will  expand 
without  limit  on  the  basis  of  a  fixed  amount  of  real 
property.  In  short,  given  the  rate  differential,  the 
real  bills  doctrine  provides  no  bar  to  overissue.  Sec- 
ond,  the  ineffectiveness  of  the  real  bills  constraint 
renders  invalid  the  notion  that  it  is  safe  to  allow  the 
money  supply  to  adapt  itself  automatically  to  the 
needs  of  trade.  Said  Thornton, 
Any  supposition  that  it  would  be  safe  to  permit  the 
bank  paper  to  limit  itself,  because  this  would  be  to 
take  the  more  natural  course,  is,  therefore,  al- 
together  erroneous.  It  implies  that  there  is  no 
occasion  to  advert  to  the  rate  of  interest  in  con- 
sideration  of  which  the  bank  paper  is  furnished,  or 
to  change  that  rate  according  to  the  varying  cir- 
cumstances  of  the  country.19 
To  summarize,  in  Thornton’s  view  the  real  bills  con- 
straint  offered  no  effective  limit  on  the  money  supply. 
To  achieve  monetary  stability,  other  constraints  (e.g., 
convertibility,  a  loan  rate  equal  to  the  profit  rate  or, 
alternatively,  direct  credit  rationing)  were  required. 
where  P  denotes  prices,  MS  denotes  the  money  stock,  the 
dots  denote  the  rates  of  rise  (time  derivatives)  of  those 
variables,  and  k  denotes  the  proportional  relationship 
between  inflation  and  money  growth.  Substituting  equa- 
tion  1  into  equations  2  and  3  yields 
These  equations  identify  the  profit  rate-loan  rate  differ- 
ential  as  the  ultimate  cause  of  the  rise  in  loan  demand. 
loan  supply,  eligible  bills,  money  stock,  and  price  level- 
all  of  which  expand  without  limit  as  long  as  the  differ- 
ential  persists. 
19 Thornton,  Paper  Credit,  p.  254. 
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Thornton  was  not  alone  in  condemning  the  real 
bills  doctrine.  Among  his  contemporaries,  Lord 
King,  for  example,  contended  that  when  the  commer- 
cial  profit  rate  exceeds  the  loan  rate  of  interest  the 
demand  for  loans  and  corresponding  offer  of  eligible 
bills  “may  be  carried  to  any  assignable  extent.“20 
David  Ricardo  (1772-1823)  likewise  stated  that 
when  the  Bank  of  England  charges  less  than  the 
going  rate  of  profit  “there  is  no  amount  of  money 
which  they  might  not  lend.“21  He  also  denied  that 
the  needs  of trade  could  effectively  limit  the  note  issue 
since,  via  the  resulting  rise  in  prices,  commerce  could 
absorb  any  conceivable  quantity  of  notes. 
Despite  these  criticisms,  the  real  bills  doctrine  sur- 
vived  in  19th  and  20th  century  banking  tradition 
thus  “scoring  high  on  the  list  of  ‘longest-lived  eco- 
nomic  fallacies  of all  times’.“22  Renamed  the  Principle 
of  Reflux  (according  to  which  overissue  is  impossible 
since  any  excess  notes  will  be  returned  immediately 
to  the  banks  to  repay  loans),  it  reappeared  in  the 
Currency  School-Banking  School  controversy  that 
took  place  in  England  in  the  middle  decades  of  the 
19th  century.  In  particular,  Banking  School  writers 
Thomas  Tooke  and  John  Fullerton  used  it  “to  refute 
the  alleged  necessity  of  any  regulation  of  the  note 
issue  other  than  the  obligation  of  convertibility;  and 
to  this  end  they  sought  to  establish  that  so  long  as 
notes  were  issued  on  good  security  and  were  ulti- 
mately  convertible  there  was  no  danger  of  over- 
issue.“23 
In  the  late  19th  and  early  20th  centuries  the  doc- 
trine  reappeared  in  the  United  States  where  it  formed 
the  theoretical  mainstay  of  such  proponents  of  bank- 
ing  reform  as  Charles  A.  Conant,  A.  Barton  Hep- 
burn,  J.  Laurence  Laughlin,  William  A.  Scott, 
Horace  White,  and  H.  Parker  Willis-all  of  whom 
believed  that  the  currency  should  be  based  upon 
20 Lord  King,  Thoughts  on  the  Effects  of  the  Bank 
Restrictions,  2nd  ed.,  1804,  p.  22.  Quoted  in  Jacob  Viner, 
Studies  in  the  Theory  of  International  Trade  (New  York: 
Augustus  Kelley,  1965),  p.  149. 
21 David  Ricardo,  Principles  of  Political  Economy  and 
Taxation,  3rd  ed.  [1821],  quoted  in  Viner,  Studies,  p.  150. 
22 Mark  Blaug,  Economic  Theory  in  Retrospect,  3rd  ed., 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press), p.  56. 
23 Lord  Robbins,  The  Theory  of  Economic  Development 
in  the  History  of  Economic  Thought  (New  York:  St. 
Martin’s  Press,  1968),  p.  141. 
commercial  paper  arising  from  real  transactions.24 
The  doctrine  was  attacked  in  1905  by  A.  Piatt 
Andrew  who  pointed  to  the  two-way  inflationary 
interaction  between  money  and  prices  inherent  in  the 
real  bills  mechanism.  Said  Andrew  of  this  infla- 
tionary  feedback  loop  running  from  money  to  prices 
and  prices to  money: 
every  new  extension  of  credit,  though  based  upon 
the  money  value  of  goods,  would  tend  to  raise  the 
price  level,  and  each  elevation  of  the  price  level  in 
its  turn  would  justify  a  further  extension  of  credit. 
The  two  movements  might  continue  pursuing  each 
other  until  eternity  and  yet  the  aggregate  value 
of  the  means  of  payment  would  not  become  co- 
extensive  with  the  money  value  of  all  property. 
The  alleged  limitation  of  bank  credit  by  ‘the  value 
of  goods  and  property  owned  by  borrowers’  is  from 
every  point  of  view  delusive.  It  is  not  only  untrue; 
it  is  impossible.25 
In other  words,  the  real  bills  doctrine  embodies  an 
inflationary  transmission  mechanism  running  from 
money  to  prices  to  the  level  of  economic  activity  or 
needs  of  trade  (a  nominal  magnitude  that  rises  in 
step  with  prices)  and  back  again  to  money  in  a never- 
ending,  explosive  sequence.  In  short,  because  it 
cannot  distinguish  between  the  price  and  output  com- 
ponents  of  economic  activity,  the  real  bills  criterion 
constitutes  no  bar  to  the  inflationary  overissue  of 
money. 
Andrew’s  criticism  notwithstanding,  the  doctrine 
was  enshrined  as  a  key  concept  in  the  Federal  Re- 
serve  Act  of  1913.  The  Act  provided  for  the  exten- 
sion  of  reserve  bank  credit  (chiefly  loans  to  member 
banks)  via  the  Federal  Reserve’s  rediscounting  of 
eligible  (short-term,  self-liquidating)  commercial 
paper  presented  to  it  by  member  banks.  As  if  to 
underscore  its  allegiance  to  the  doctrine,  the  Federal 
Reserve  Board  in  its  famous  Tenth  Annual  Report 
for  1923  stated  that  “It  is the  belief  of  the  Board  that 
there  is  little  danger  that  the  credit  created  and 
distributed  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks  will  be  in 
excessive  volume  if  restricted  to  productive  uses.” 
And  in  its  ruling  as  to  the  kinds  of  eligible  paper  that 
member  banks  could  present  for  rediscount,  the 
Board  showed  that  by  “productive  uses”  it  meant 
loans  to  finance  the  production  and  marketing  of 
actual  goods. 
24 Mints,  History,  pp.  206-7,  footnote  33.  See  also  Robert 
Craig  West,  Banking  Reform  and  the  Federal  Reserve, 
1863-1923  (Ithaca,  N.  Y.,  Cornell  University  Press,  1977), 
Chap. 7. 
25 “Credit  and  the  Value  of  Money.”  Publications  of  the 
American  Economic  Association,  VI  (3d.  ser.,  1905), 
111. 
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Reichsbank’s  policy  of  issuing  astronomical  sums  of 
money  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  trade  at  ever-rising 
prices  during  the  German  hyperinflation  of  1922- 
1923.  Oblivious  of  Thornton’s  demonstration  that 
the  real  bills  criterion  is  no  bar  to  inflationary  over- 
issue  when  the  borrowing  rate  is  pegged  below  the 
going  profit  rate,  the  Reichsbank  insisted  on  pegging 
its  discount  rate  at  a  level  no  higher  than  90  percent 
at  a  time  when  the  going  market  rate  of  interest  was 
in  excess  of  7000  percent  per  annum.  This  huge 
interest  differential  of  course  made  it  extremely  prof- 
itable  for  banks  to  rediscount  bills  with  the  Reichs- 
bank  and  to  loan  out  the  proceeds,  thereby  producing 
additional  inflationary  expansions  of  the  money 
supply  and  further  upward  pressure  on  interest  rates, 
If  the  authorities  recognized  this,  however,  they  did 
nothing  to  stop  it.  On  the  contrary,  throughout  the 
hyperinflation  episode  the  Reichsbank’s  president, 
Rudolf  Havenstein,  considered  it  his  duty  to  supply 
the  growing  sums  of  money  required  to  conduct  real 
transactions  at  skyrocketing  prices.  Citing  the  real 
bills  doctrine,  he  refused  to  believe  that  issuing  money 
in  favor  of  businessmen  against  genuine  commercial 
bills  could  have  an  inflationary  effect.  He  simply 
failed  to  understand  that  linking  the  money  supply 
to  a  nominal  variable  that  moves  in  step  with  prices 
is  tantamount  to  creating  an  engine  of inflation.  That 
is,  he  succumbed  to  the  fallacy  of  using  one  uncon- 
trolled  nominal  variable  (the  money  value  of  eco- 
nomic  activity)  to  regulate  another  nominal  variable 
(the  money  stock). 
Survival  of  the  Real  Bills  Fallacy  in the 
Interest-Pegging  Scheme 
The  foregoing  fallacy  survives  today  in  the  notion 
that  the  Federal  Reserve  should  use  easy  monetary 
policy  to  lower  interest  rates  to  target  levels  con- 
sistent  with  full  employment.  For  just  as  the  real 
bills  doctrine  calls  for  expanding  the  money  stock 
with  rises  in  the  needs  of  trade,  so  does  the  interest- 
targeting  proposal  call  for  increasing  the  money 
supply  when  the  market  rate  of interest  rises  above  its 
target  level-this  monetary  expansion  continuing 
until  the  rate  disparity  is  eliminated.  Here  again  is 
the  fallacy  of  using  one  uncontrolled  nominal  variable 
(the  market  rate-target  rate  differential)  as  a  guide 
to  regulating  the  nominal  money  stock. 
Moreover,  tying  the  money  stock  to  the  market 
rate-target  rate  differential  produces  the  same  infla- 
tionary  feedback  of  prices  to  money  and  money  to 
prices  that  characterizes  the  real  bills  mechanism. 
For  the  more  the  Fed  expands  the  money  supply  in  a 
vain  effort  to  get  interest  rates  down,  the  greater  the 
inflationary  pressure  it  puts  on  those  rates.  And  the 
more  those  rates  rise,  the  greater  the  monetary  ex- 
pansion  required  to  temporarily  lower  them.  Thus 
the  attempt  to  peg  interest  rates  generates  a  dynam- 
ically  unstable  process  in  which  money  and  prices 
chase  each  other  upward  ad  infinitum  in  a cumulative 
inflationary  spiral.  Like  the  real  bills  criterion,  the 
interest-pegging  scheme  provides  no  effective  con- 
straint  on  money  or  prices,  both  of which  rise  without 
limit.  Because  of  this  the  interest-targeting  proposal 
may  be  viewed  as  merely  the  latest  reincarnation  of 
the  discredited  real  bills  fallacy. 
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